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The internationalization of accounting standards by many countries around the world is set to 
significantly change companies’ financial reports. Standard setters, governments and securities 
exchanges have been united in the push towards a common set of international accounting 
standards. Expected benefits of internationalizing accounting standards include increased 
comparability and providing financial report users with better quality information on which to 
base their investment and credit decisions (AASB 1994). These expectations implicitly assume 
that adoption of international accounting standards will lead to improvements in the quality of 
reported financial information.  
 
The question of whether adoption of international accounting standards leads to improvements in 
the quality of information presented in financial reports has been the subject of an increasing 
number of recent studies. Much of this research is motivated by the wholesale adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by European Union (EU) countries and 
others, such as Australia. This study by Daske and Gebhardt (hereafter referred to as DG) is 
similarly motivated by the widespread adoption of IFRS. They seek to find evidence of whether 
adoption of internationally recognized standards by companies in Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland has led to higher quality financial reporting. An important distinction between the 
DG study and other similar studies is that most other studies have only indirectly tested 
disclosure quality, whereas DG more directly test this issue through experts’ disclosure quality 
scores of companies’ annual reports.  
 
Prior research generally examines quality of information under international accounting 
standards using proxies, such as timeliness of recognizing unrealized losses in income (Ball, 
Robin and Wu, 2003), lower bid-ask spreads (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), increases in analysts’ 
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earning forecast accuracy (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001), differences in value relevance of 
disclosures, and reductions in firms’ cost of capital (Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2005). The use 
of proxies can give rise to problems with interpreting results due to potential correlated omitted 
variables and measurement error in the proxies (Joos, 2000). The DG study avoids such issues by 
using direct measures of disclosure quality. Using independent experts’ ratings of disclosure 
quality, DG test for differences between the scores of firms applying domestic standards and 
those applying IFRS or US GAAP. They report that disclosure scores of domestic standard firms 
are consistently lower than firms applying IFRS  or US GAAP, and these results hold for firms  
which voluntarily adopted IFRS or US GAAP, as well as for certain firms which are required to 
mandatorily adopt those standards.  
 
DG’s findings provide compelling evidence that disclosure quality increased with the adoption of 
IFRS or US GAAP. They caution that their evidence cannot establish direct causality due to self-
selection issues. Other issues which were raised by forum participants and which also need to be 
considered when interpreting their results include: (1) the extent to which the disclosure scores 
measure financial reporting quality, (2) standardization  of the experts’ scores over time and 
across institutional settings, and (3) including firms that adopted US GAAP in the analysis.  
 
Measuring quality of financial information is inherently problematic. Ball et al (2003, footnote 3, 
p. 237) define “quality” as  
 
… the extent to which accounting information reflects the underlying economic situation 
of the firm. It is related to the concept of “transparency,” defined as the ability of users to 
“see through” the financial statements to comprehend the underlying accounting events 
and transactions in the firm.  
 
The IASB Framework specifies the objective of financial reports as providing information useful 
for decision-making, and identifies four principal qualitative characteristics that determine the 
usefulness of information in financial reports: understandability, relevance, reliability and 
comparability. If accounting standards are developed so that they are consistent with the 
Framework financial reporting objective and qualitative characteristics, it can be assumed that 
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the resulting standards are of ‘high quality’. However, as observed by Ball et al (2003, p.260), 
“high-quality standards do not guarantee high-quality financial reporting.”  They suggest that 
country-specific institutional influences on preparers’ financial reporting incentives are a 
predominant factor impacting on the quality of financial reporting, and those incentives are 
subject to both political and market forces. Political forces include the extent to which 
accounting standards are codified and enforced, and market forces relate to the extent of demand 
for high-quality financial reporting. Given these political and market forces, Ball et al (2003, 
p.259) conclude “homogenizing accounting standards alone will have a limited effect on the 
quality of accounting information actually reported” (emphasis in original).      
 
In their study, DG use independent experts’ ratings of company annual reports as a measure of 
financial reporting quality. They compare disclosure quality scores of companies which prepared 
their financial reports using domestic accounting standards, and those that used IFRS or US 
GAAP, to see whether there are systematic differences in the scores under the alternative 
accounting standards. In using those experts’ scores, DG implicitly assume the scores directly 
measure financial reporting quality. However, from the information in DG’s Appendix A, it 
appears that the scores are based on both financial and non-financial disclosures. DG 
acknowledge that the scores for the Austrian sample firms are noisy disclosure quality measures 
due to inclusion of non-financial information in the rating scheme. The scores for the Swiss and 
German samples also appear to include some non-financial information, but perhaps to a lesser 
extent. It is therefore unknown to what extent voluntary and other non-financial disclosures that 
are not subject to accounting standards compliance, contribute to improving the disclosure 
ratings. Could it be that companies adopted IFRS/US GAAP as part of a broader program of 
improved corporate governance practices, including disclosure? If so, the strategic changes firms 
may have made concurrently with adopting IFRS/US GAAP are potentially correlated omitted 
variables.  
 
A related issue is the differences in the disclosure quality scoring systems across the three 
countries and within countries over the study period. DG’s score standardization methods appear 
to be effective in creating a common base for comparing the scores over time within countries. 
However, as DG rightly point out, the significant differences in the rating schemes of the three 
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countries means that the scores are not directly comparable between countries. Changes to the 
German scoring system during the study period potentially threaten the validity of their findings. 
Nevertheless, their results show that for each year of the study period, the standardized scores 
and rankings are  consistently higher for firms adopting IFRS/US GAAP than those with reports 
prepared in accordance with domestic GAAP. The most compelling evidence is for the German 
firms that switched from domestic GAAP to IFRS/US GAAP, with significantly higher average 
scores and rankings in the year after the switch than in the immediately preceding year. Their 
results however are presented on a pooled basis and it would have been interesting to see 
whether they generally hold for each year.  
 
The focus of the DG study is International Financial Reporting Standards, yet they include in 
their sample firms which adopted US GAAP. They do not explain why US GAAP adopting firms 
are included, but infer an expectation that firms applying “internationally recognized” accounting 
standards will have high disclosure quality scores than those applying domestic GAAP. DG 
provide separate analyses of domestic standards versus each of IFRS and US GAAP. Clearly, the 
IFRS and US-GAAP groups of firms are not homogeneous, given the significant differences in 
the average scores for each group in both Switzerland and Germany. Moreover, the direction of 
the differences in scores are positive for German firms (IFRS-firms scored higher than US 
GAAP-firms), and negative for Swiss firms (IFRS-firms scored lower than US GAAP firms).  
Yet GD pooled the IFRS and US GAAP adopters into one category for their multivariate 
analysis. It is not evident how such pooling has affected their results (weakened or strengthened) 
but the regression analyses can largely only be interpreted as evidence of differences between 
domestic and non-domestic GAAP. Pooling of US-GAAP adopting firms with IFRS firms in the 
regression analyses somewhat weakens their conclusion that “the quality of financial reports has 
increased significantly with the adoption of IFRS.”  
 
DG also compare the scores and relative ranks of companies listed on a US stock exchange (and 
therefore apply US GAAP) with IFRS/US GAAP adopters not listed in the US and find that for 
both the German and Swiss samples, the US-listed firms have significantly higher average scores 
and rankings. They interpret this result as consistent with prior research which suggests that 
firms that are subject to enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
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exposed to greater legal liability in the US, effectively ‘bond’ themselves to higher transparency 
when they list on a US securities exchange. However, DG could have tested the effects of US-
listing on disclosure scores more directly by comparing only the US-GAAP non-US listed firms 
with those listed in the US, to confirm whether US-listing has such bonding effects.  
 
Notwithstanding these reservations, DG provide convincing evidence that adoption of IFRS/US 
GAAP is associated with better quality reporting. The validity of their findings is also enhanced 
by the fact that they use a direct measure – experts’ disclosure quality ratings – in testing, rather 
than proxies used by many other studies examining this issue.    
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